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Provably Secure Group Signature Schemes from
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Martianus Frederic Ezerman, Hyung Tae Lee, San Ling, Khoa Nguyen, and Huaxiong Wang
Abstract
We solve an open question in code-based cryptography by introducing two provably secure group signature schemes from
code-based assumptions. Our basic scheme satisfies the CPA-anonymity and traceability requirements in the random oracle model,
assuming the hardness of the McEliece problem, the Learning Parity with Noise problem, and a variant of the Syndrome Decoding
problem. The construction produces smaller key and signature sizes than the previous post-quantum group signature schemes
from lattices, as long as the cardinality of the underlying group does not exceed 224, which is roughly comparable to the current
population of the Netherlands. We develop the basic scheme further to achieve the strongest anonymity notion, i.e., CCA-anonymity,
with a small overhead in terms of efficiency. The feasibility of two proposed schemes is supported by implementation results.
Our two schemes are the first in their respective classes of provably secure groups signature schemes. Additionally, the techniques
introduced in this work might be of independent interest. These are a new verifiable encryption protocol for the randomized
McEliece encryption and a novel approach to design formal security reductions from the Syndrome Decoding problem.
Index Terms
post-quantum cryptography, code-based group signature, zero-knowledge protocol, McEliece encryption, syndrome decoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Group signature [1] is a fundamental cryptographic primitive with two intriguing features. The first one is anonymity. It
allows users of a group to anonymously sign documents on behalf of the whole group. The second one is traceability. There
exists a tracing authority that can tie a given signature to the signer’s identity should the need arise. These two properties
make group signatures highly useful in various real-life scenarios such as controlled anonymous printing services, digital right
management systems, e-bidding and e-voting schemes. Theoretically, designing secure and efficient group signature schemes
is of deep interest since doing so typically requires a sophisticated combination of carefully chosen cryptographic ingredients.
Numerous constructions of group signatures have been proposed. Most of them, e.g., the respective schemes in [2], [3], [4],
[5], and [6], are based on classical number-theoretic assumptions.
While number-theoretic-based group signatures, such as those in [3] and [4], can be very efficient, they would become insecure
once the era of scalable quantum computing arrives [7]. Prior to our work, the search for post-quantum group signatures, as
a preparation for the future, has been quite active, with at least six published schemes [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. All of
them are based on computational assumptions from lattices. Despite their theoretical interest, the schemes require significantly
large key and signature sizes. None of them has been supported by implementation results. Our evaluation, in Section I-B
below, shows that these lattice-based schemes are indeed very far from being practical. This somewhat unsatisfactory situation
highlights two interesting challenges. The first one is to push post-quantum group signatures closer to practice. The second one
is to bring more diversity in, with schemes from other candidates for post-quantum cryptography, e.g., code-based, hash-based,
and multivariate-based. An easy-to-implement and competitively efficient code-based group signature scheme, for instance,
would be highly desirable.
A code-based group signature, in the strongest security model for static groups as discussed in [14], typically requires the
following three cryptographic layers.
1) The first layer requires a secure (standard) signature scheme to sign messages. Note that in most schemes based on the
model in [14], a standard signature is also employed to issue the users’ secret keys. However, this is not necessary. The
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2scheme constructed in this paper is an illustrative example. We observe that existing code-based signatures fall into two
categories.
The “hash-and-sign” category consists of the CFS signature [15] and its modified versions [16], [17], [18]. The known
security proofs for schemes in this category, however, should be viewed with skepticism. The assumption used in [16], for
example, had been invalidated by the distinguishing attacks detailed in [19], while the new assumption proposed in [18]
lies on a rather fragile ground.
The “Fiat-Shamir” category consists of schemes derived from Stern’s identification protocol in [20] and its variants in [21],
[22], and [23] via the Fiat-Shamir transformation from [24]. Although these schemes produce relatively large signatures,
as the underlying protocol has to be repeated many times to make the soundness error negligibly small, their provable
security, in the random oracle model, is well-understood.
2) The second layer demands a semantically secure encryption scheme to enable the tracing feature. The signer is
constrained to encrypt its identifying information and to send the ciphertext as part of the group signature, so that
the tracing authority can decrypt if and when necessary. This ingredient is also available in code-based cryptography,
thanks to various CPA-secure and CCA-secure variants of the McEliece [25] and the Niederreiter [26] cryptosystems
available in, e.g., [27], [28], [29], and [30].
3) The third layer requires a zero-knowledge (ZK) protocol that connects the previous two layers. This is essentially the
bottleneck in realizing secure code-based group signatures. Specifically, the protocol should demonstrate that a given
signature is generated by a certain certified group user who honestly encrypts its identifying information. Constructing
such a protocol is quite challenging. There have been ZK protocols involving the CFS and Stern’s signatures, which yield
identity-based identification schemes in [31], [32], and [33] and threshold ring signatures in [34] and [35]. There have also
been ZK proofs of plaintext knowledge for the McEliece and the Niederreiter cryptosystems [36]. Yet we are unaware of
any efficient ZK protocol that simultaneously deals with both code-based signature and encryption schemes in the above
sense.
Designing provably secure group signature schemes has been a long-standing open question in code-based cryptography, as
was also discussed in [37].
B. Our Contributions
This work introduces two group signature schemes which are provably secure under code-based assumptions. Specifically,
our basic scheme achieves the CPA-anonymity [4] and the traceability requirements in [14] in the random oracle model.
We assume the hardness of the McEliece problem, the Learning Parity with Noise problem, and a variant of the Syndrome
Decoding problem. The basic scheme is then extended to achieve anonymity in the strongest sense [14], i.e., CCA-anonymity,
for which the adversary is allowed to adaptively query for the opening of group signatures. Our two schemes are the first of
their respective classes.
Contributions to Code-Based Cryptography. By introducing provably secure code-based group signature schemes, we solve
the open problem discussed earlier. Along the way, we introduce the following two new techniques for code-based cryptography,
which might be of independent interest.
1) We design a ZK protocol for the randomized McEliece encryption scheme. The protocol allows the prover to convince the
verifier that a given ciphertext is well-formed and that the hidden plaintext satisfies an additional condition. Such verifiable
encryption protocols are useful, not only in constructing group signatures, but also in much broader contexts [38]. It is
worth noting that, prior to our work, verifiable encryption protocols for code-based cryptosystems only exist in a very
basic form where the plaintext is publicly given [36], restricting their applications.
2) In our security proof of the traceability property, to obtain a reduction from the hardness of the Syndrome Decoding (SD)
problem, we come up with an approach that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered in the literature before.
Let us recall the (average-case) SD problem with parameters m, r, ω. Given a uniformly random matrix H˜ ∈ Fr×m2 and
a uniformly random syndrome y˜ ∈ Fr2, the problem asks to find a vector s ∈ F
m
2 of Hamming weight ω, denoted by
s ∈ B(m,ω), such that H˜ · s⊤ = y˜⊤. In our scheme, the key generation algorithm produces a public key that contains
a matrix H ∈ Fr×m2 and syndromes yj ∈ F
r
2, while users are given secret keys of the form sj ∈ B(m,ω) such that
H · s⊤j = y
⊤
j . In the security proof, since we would like to embed an SD challenge instance (H˜, y˜) into the public
key without being noticed, except with negligible probability, by the adversary, we have to require that H and the yj ’s
produced by the key generation are indistinguishable from uniform.
One method to generate these keys is to employ the “hash-and-sign” technique from the CFS signature [15]. Unfortunately,
while the syndromes yj’s could be made uniformly random, as the outputs of the random oracle, the assumption that the
CFS matrix H is computationally close to uniform for practical parameters is invalidated by the distinguishing attacks
from [19].
Another method, pioneered by Stern [20], is to pick H and the sj’s uniformly at random. The corresponding syndromes
yj’s could be made computationally close to uniform if the parameters are set such that ω is slightly smaller than the
3value ω0 given by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, i.e., ω0 such that
(
m
ω0
)
≈ 2r. In such a case, the function fH(sj) = H ·s⊤j
acts as a pseudorandom generator [39]. However, for these parameters, it is not guaranteed with high probability that a
uniformly random SD instance (H˜, y˜) has solutions, which would affect the success probability of the reduction algorithm.
Our work considers the case when ω is moderately larger than ω0, so that two conditions hold. First, the uniform distribution
over the set B(m,ω) has sufficient min-entropy to apply the Left-over Hash Lemma from [40]. Second, the SD problem
with parameters (m, r, ω) admits solutions with high probability, yet remains intractable against the best known attacks
from [42] and [43]. Note that the variant of the SD problem considered in this work are not widely believed to be the
hardest one [20], [41], but suitable parameters can be chosen such that the best known attacks run in exponential time.
Further treatment on how to decide on the parameters will be given in Section VI. This approach gives us a new method
to generate uniformly random vectors sj ∈ B(m,ω) and a matrix H ∈ F
r×m
2 so that the syndromes yj’s corresponding
to the sj’s are statistically close to uniform. The approach, which somewhat resembles the technique used in [44] for
the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution problem, is helpful in our security proof and, generally, in designing formal
security reductions from the SD problem.
Contributions to Post-Quantum Group Signatures. Our constructions provide the first non-lattice-based alternatives to
provably secure post-quantum group signatures. Our schemes feature public key and signature sizes linear in the number of
group users N , which are asymptotically not as efficient as the previously published lattice-based counterparts [10], [11],
[12], [13]. However, when instantiated with practical parameters, our schemes behave much more efficiently than the scheme
proposed in [13]. The latter is arguably the current most efficient lattice-based group signature in the asymptotic sense. Indeed,
our estimation shows that our basic scheme, which achieves the CPA-anonymity notion, gives public key and signature sizes
that are 2, 300 times and 540 times smaller, respectively, for an average-size group of N = 28 users. As N grows, the
advantage lessens, but our basic scheme remains more efficient even for a huge group of N = 224 users, a number which is
roughly comparable to the current population of the Netherlands. Our extended scheme, which achieves the strongest anonymity
notion, i.e., CCA-anonymity, introduces only a small overhead of about 434 KB and 177 KB in public key and signature sizes,
respectively, compared to the basic scheme. Table I gives the details of our estimation. The parameters for our schemes are
set as in Section VI. For the scheme in [13], we choose the commonly used lattice dimension n = 28 and set the parameters
m = 29 × 150 and q = 2150 to satisfy the requirements given in [13, Section 5.1]. While our basic scheme and the scheme
in [13] achieve the CPA-anonymity notion [4], our extended scheme achieves the CCA-anonymity notion [14]. All schemes
have soundness error 2−80.
We give actual implementation results for our proposed schemes to support their claim of feasibility. In our implementations,
as presented later in Section VI, the actual signature sizes can be reduced thanks to an additional technique. Our schemes
are the first post-quantum group signature that comes supported with an actual deployment analysis. The results, while not
yielding a truly practical scheme, certainly help in bringing post-quantum group signatures closer to practice.
TABLE I
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR SCHEMES AND [13].
Anonymity N Public Key Size Signature Size
Ours
CPA
28 5.13× 106 bits ( 642 KB) 8.57× 106 bits (1.07 MB)
216 4.10× 107 bits (5.13 MB) 1.77× 107 bits (2.21 MB)
224 9.23× 109 bits (1.16 GB) 2.36× 109 bits (294 MB)
CCA
28 8.60× 106 bits (1.08 MB) 9.99× 106 bits (1.25 MB)
216 4.45× 107 bits (5.56 MB) 1.91× 107 bits (2.39 MB)
224 9.23× 109 bits (1.16 GB) 2.36× 109 bits (294 MB)
[13] CPA ≤ 224 1.18 × 1010 bits (1.48 GB) 4.63× 109 bits (579 MB)
C. Overview of Our Techniques
Let m, r, ω, n, k, t and ℓ be positive integers. We consider a group of size N = 2ℓ, where each user is indexed by an integer
j ∈ [0, N − 1]. The secret signing key of user j is a vector sj chosen uniformly at random from the set B(m,ω). A uniformly
random matrix H ∈ Fr×m2 and N syndromes y0, . . . ,yN−1 ∈ F
r
2, such that H · s
⊤
j = y
⊤
j , for all j, are made public. Let us
now explain the development of the three ingredients used in our basic scheme.
The Signature Layer. User j can run Stern’s ZK protocol [20] to prove the possession of a vector s ∈ B(m,ω) such that
H · s⊤ = y⊤j . The constraint s ∈ B(m,ω) is proved in ZK by randomly permuting the entries of s and showing that the
permuted vector belongs to B(m,ω). The protocol is then transformed into a Fiat-Shamir signature [24]. However, such a
signature is publicly verifiable only if the index j is given to the verifier.
The user can further hide its index j to achieve unconditional anonymity among all N users. This, incidentally, yields a
ring signature [45] on the way, a` la [46]. Let A =
[
y⊤0 | · · · |y
⊤
j | · · · |y
⊤
N−1
]
∈ Fr×N2 . Let x = δ
N
j be the N -dimensional unit
4vector with entry 1 at the j-th position and 0 elsewhere. Observe that A · x⊤ = y⊤j , and thus, the equation H · s
⊤ = y⊤j can
be written as
H · s⊤ ⊕A · x⊤ = 0, (1)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. Stern’s framework allows the user to prove in ZK the possession of (s,x) satisfying this
equation, where the condition x = δNj can be justified using a random permutation.
The Encryption Layer. To enable the tracing capability of the scheme, we let user j encrypt the binary representation of j
via the randomized McEliece encryption scheme [27]. Specifically, we represent j as I2B(j) = (j0, . . . , jℓ−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, where∑ℓ−1
i=0 ji2
ℓ−1−i = j. Given a public encrypting key G ∈ Fk×n2 , a ciphertext of I2B(j) is of the form
c =
(
u‖ I2B(j)
)
·G⊕ e ∈ Fn2 , (2)
where (u, e) is the encryption randomness, with u ∈ Fk−ℓ2 , and e ∈ B(n, t), i.e., e is a vector of weight t in F
n
2 .
Connecting the Signature and Encryption Layers. User j must demonstrate that it does not cheat, e.g., by encrypting some
string that does not point to j, without revealing j. Thus, we need a ZK protocol that allows the user to prove that the vector
x = δNj used in (1) and the plaintext hidden in (2) both correspond to the same secret j ∈ [0, N − 1]. The crucial challenge is
to establish a connection, which must be verifiable in ZK, between the “index representation” δNj and the binary representation
I2B(j). We show how to handle this challenge well.
Instead of working with I2B(j) = (j0, . . . , jℓ−1), let us consider an extension of I2B(j), defined as
Encode(j) = (1 − j0, j0, . . . , 1− ji, ji, . . . , 1− jℓ−1, jℓ−1) ∈ F
2ℓ
2 .
We then suitably insert ℓ zero-rows into G to obtain Ĝ ∈ F
(k+ℓ)×n
2 such that
(
u‖Encode(j)
)
·Ĝ =
(
u‖ I2B(j)
)
·G. Letting
f = Encode(j), we rewrite (2) as
c =
(
u‖ f
)
· Ĝ⊕ e ∈ Fn2 . (3)
Now, let B2I : {0, 1}ℓ → [0, N − 1] be the inverse function of I2B(·). For every b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, we carefully design two classes
of permutations Tb : F
N
2 → F
N
2 and T
′
b
: F2ℓ2 → F
2ℓ
2 , such that, for any j ∈ [0, N − 1],
x = δNj ⇐⇒ Tb(x) = δ
N
B2I(I2B(j)⊕b) and f = Encode(j) ⇐⇒ T
′
b(f) = Encode(B2I(I2B(j)⊕ b)).
Given the equivalences, the protocol’s user samples a uniformly random vector b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and sends b1 = I2B(j)⊕ b. The
verifier, seeing that
Tb(x) = δ
N
B2I(b1)
and T ′
b
(f) = Encode(B2I(b1)),
should be convinced that x and f correspond to the same j ∈ [0, N − 1], yet the value of j is completely hidden from its view
since b acts essentially as a one-time pad.
The technique extending I2B(j) into Encode(j) and then permuting Encode(j) in a “one-time pad” fashion is inspired by
a method originally proposed by Langlois et al. in [11] in a seemingly unrelated context. There, the goal is to prove that the
message being signed under the Bonsai tree signature [47] is of the form I2B(j), for some j ∈ [0, N − 1]. Here, we adapt and
develop their method to simultaneously prove two facts. First, the plaintext being encrypted under the randomized McEliece
encryption is of the form I2B(j). Second, the unit vector x = δNj is used in the signature layer.
By embedding the above technique into Stern’s framework, we obtain an interactive ZK argument system, in which, given
the public input (H,A,G), the user is able to prove the possession of a secret tuple (j, s,x,u, f , e) satisfying (1) and (3).
The protocol is repeated many times to achieve negligible soundness error, and then made non-interactive, resulting in a non-
interactive ZK argument of knowledge Π. The final group signature is of the form (c,Π), where c is the ciphertext. In the
random oracle model, the anonymity of the scheme relies on the zero-knowledge property of Π and the CPA-security of the
randomized McEliece encryption scheme, while its traceability is based on the hardness of the variant of the SD problem
discussed earlier.
Achieving CCA-Anonymity. Our basic group signature scheme makes use of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme
that achieves only CPA-security. Hence, it only satisfies CPA-anonymity for which the adversary is not granted access to the
signature opening oracle. To achieve the strongest notion of anonymity put forward in [14], i.e., CCA-anonymity, we would
need a CCA2-secure encryption scheme so that we can respond to adaptive opening queries from the adversary by invoking
the decryption oracle associated with the encryption mechanism. There are a number of known CCA2-secure code-based
encryption schemes, e.g., [28], [29], [30]. They are, however, either too inefficient, say with ciphertext size quadratic in the
security parameter, or incompatible with zero-knowledge protocols for proving the well-formedness of ciphertexts. Hence, they
are unsuitable for our purpose. Instead, we exploit the fact that our verifiable encryption protocol for the randomized McEliece
scheme is a simulation-sound ZK argument of knowledge. We then upgrade the encryption system further to a CCA2-secure
one via the Naor-Yung twin-encryption paradigm [51]. The protocol operates in Stern’s framework and satisfies the “quasi-
unique responses” property in [48], deriving simulation-soundness from soundness. This fact was recently exploited by several
group signature schemes, such as [49] and [50], which are based on Stern-like protocols.
5Specifically, we will work with two public keys G(1) and G(2) of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme. The user
now encrypts I2B(j) under each of the keys to obtain ciphertexts c(1) and c(2), respectively, and extend the verifiable encryption
protocol discussed above to prove that these ciphertexts are well-formed and correspond to the same plaintext I2B(j), which is
the binary representation of the user’s index j. This extension is quite smooth, since the same techniques for handling ciphertext
c can be used to handle c(1) and c(2). In the proof of CCA-anonymity, we then employ the strategy of [52] that makes use
of the CPA-security of the underlying encryption scheme and the zero-knowledge, soundness and simulation-soundness of the
resulting non-interactive argument. In terms of efficiency, our CCA-anonymous construction only has a small and reasonable
overhead compared to its CPA-anonymous version, with one more McEliece encrypting matrix in the group public key and
one more ciphertext equipped with its supporting ZK sub-protocol in the group signature.
D. Related Works
The present paper is the full extension of our earlier work [53], which was published in the proceedings of ASIACRYPT
2015. Achieving CCA-anonymity for code-based group signatures was raised as an open question in [53]. We are able to fully
address the problem in this work.
In a work concurrent to and independent of [53], Alame´lou et al. also proposed a code-based group signature scheme in [54]
and, later on, in [55]. Their scheme considers the setting of dynamic groups. It does not use any encryption mechanism to
enable traceability. Instead, the authors rely on a modified version of Stern’s protocol that allows the opening authority to test
whether each protocol execution is generated using a secret key of a given user. Unfortunately, such approach does not yield
a secure group signature. Recall that Stern’s protocol admits a soundness error of 2/3 in each execution. It has to be repeated
κ = ω(logλ) times, where λ is the security parameter, to make the error negligibly small. Then, a valid signature is generated
by an honest user j if and only if the tests for all κ executions of the protocol yield the same user j. Unfortunately, the
testing mechanism used in their scheme fails to capture this crucial point. When running through protocol execution numbers
1, 2, . . . , κ, it stops and outputs user j when it sees the first execution that points to j. This shortcoming opens a room for
cheating users to break the traceability and non-frameability of the scheme. Specifically, a cheating user j′, who wants to
mislead the opening result to an innocent user j, can simulate the first several protocol executions. The simulation can be
done with noticeable probability using the transcript simulator associated with the protocol, because each execution admits a
soundness error of 2/3. If the opening algorithm is run, it would return j with noticeable probability. The remaining protocol
executions are done faithfully with secret key for user j′. Thus, the construction in [54] and [55] is not secure. We note that a
very similar testing mechanism for Stern-like protocols was used in [11] to avoid the use of encryption in their group signature.
This had been broken. In [56], which is the corrected version of [11], the authors eventually had to rely on an encryption-like
mechanism to enable traceability.
In a very recent work, Nguyen et al. [57] proposed a number of new code-based privacy-preserving cryptographic con-
structions, including the first code-based group signature scheme with logarithmic signature size which resolves an interesting
question we left open in [53]. In their scheme, group users are associated with leaves in a code-based Merkle tree supported by
a zero-knowledge argument of tree inclusion, which has communication cost linear in the tree depth (and hence, logarithmic
in the number of users). Although their scheme achieves better asymptotic efficiency than ours, it yields signature size larger
than 2.5 MB even for small groups. In particular, for groups of size up to 216, the signatures are longer than those produced
by our CPA-anonymous and CCA-anonymous schemes.
Subsequent to the publication of [53], a number of lattice-based group signatures have been proposed, bringing post-quantum
group signatures much closer to practice. Examples include the works done in [49], [58], [50], [59], and [60]. We believe that
this interesting research direction will continue to attract attention from the community. The hope is that some provably secure
and truly practical schemes can be realized in the near future.
II. PRELIMINARIES
NOTATIONS. Let λ be the security parameter and negl(λ) denote a negligible function in λ. We use a
$
← A if a is chosen
uniformly at random from the finite set A. The symmetric group of all permutations of k elements is denoted by Sk. Bold
capital letters, e.g., A, denote matrices. Bold lowercase letters, e.g., x, denote row vectors. We use x⊤ to denote the transpose of
x and wt(x) to denote the (Hamming) weight of x. We denote by B(m,ω) the set of all vectors x ∈ Fm2 such that wt(x) = ω.
Throughout the paper, we define a function I2B which takes a non-negative integer a as an input, and outputs the binary
representation (a0, · · · , aℓ−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ of a such that a =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 ai2
ℓ−1−i, and a function B2I which takes as an input the
binary representation (a0, · · · , aℓ−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ of a, and outputs a. All logarithms are in base 2.
A. Background on Code-Based Cryptography
We first recall the Syndrome Decoding problem. It is well-known to be NP-complete [61], and is widely believed to be
intractable in the average case for appropriate choice of parameters [20], [41].
Definition 1 (The Syndrome Decoding problem): The SD(m, r, ω) problem asks, given a uniformly random matrixH ∈ Fr×m2
and a uniformly random syndrome y ∈ Fr2, for a vector s ∈ B(m,ω) such that H · s
⊤ = y⊤. When m = m(λ), r = r(λ)
6and ω = ω(λ), we say that the SD(m, r, ω) problem is hard if the success probability of any PPT algorithm in solving the
problem is at most negl(λ).
In our security reduction, the following variant of the Left-over Hash Lemma for matrix multiplication over F2 is used.
Lemma 1 (Left-over Hash Lemma, adapted from [40]): Let D be a distribution over Fm2 with min-entropy e. For ǫ > 0 and
r ≤ e− 2 log(1/ǫ)−O(1), the statistical distance between the distribution of (H,H · s⊤), where H
$
←− Fr×m2 and s ∈ F
m
2 is
drawn from distribution D, and the uniform distribution over Fr×m2 × F
r
2 is at most ǫ.
In particular, if ω < m is an integer such that r ≤ log
(
m
ω
)
−2λ−O(1) and D is the uniform distribution over B(m,ω), i.e.,
D has min-entropy log
(
m
ω
)
, then the statistical distance between the distribution of (H,H · s⊤) and the uniform distribution
over Fr×m2 × F
r
2 is at most 2
−λ.
The Randomized McEliece Encryption Scheme. We employ the following randomized variant, suggested in [27], of the
McEliece encryption scheme [25], where a uniformly random vector is concatenated to the plaintext.
1) ME.Setup(1λ): Select the parameters n = n(λ), k = k(λ), t = t(λ) for a binary [n, k, 2t+1] Goppa code. Choose integers
k1 and k2 such that k = k1 + k2. Set the plaintext space as F
k2
2 .
2) ME.KeyGen(n, k, t): Perform the following steps.
a) Produce a generator matrix G′ ∈ Fk×n2 of a randomly selected [n, k, 2t+ 1] Goppa code. Choose a random invertible
matrix S ∈ Fk×k2 and a random permutation matrix P ∈ F
n×n
2 . Let G = SG
′P ∈ Fk×n2 .
b) Output encrypting key pkME = G and decrypting key skME = (S,G
′,P).
3) ME.Enc(pkME,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ F
k2
2 , sample u
$
←− Fk12 and e
$
← B(n, t), then output the ciphertext
c = (u‖m) ·G⊕ e ∈ Fn2 .
4) ME.Dec(skME, c): Perform the following steps.
a) Compute c ·P−1 = ((u‖m) ·G⊕ e) ·P−1 and then m′ ·S = DecodeG′(c ·P−1) where Decode is an error-correcting
algorithm with respect to G′. If Decode fails, then return ⊥.
b) Compute m′ = (m′S) · S−1, parse m′ = (u‖m), where u ∈ Fk12 and m ∈ F
k2
2 , and return m.
The scheme described above is CPA-secure in the standard model, assuming the hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem and
the DLPN(k1, n,B(n, t)) problem [27], [62]. We now recall these two problems.
Definition 2 (The Decisional McEliece problem): The DMcE(n, k, t) problem is to distinguish if a given G ∈ Fk×n2 is a
uniformly random matrix over Fk×n2 or is generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) above. When n = n(λ), k = k(λ), t = t(λ), we
say that the DMcE(n, k, t) problem is hard if the success probability of any PPT distinguisher is at most 1/2 + negl(λ).
Definition 3 (The Decisional Learning Parity with (fixed-weight) Noise problem): The DLPN(k, n,B(n, t)) problem, given
a pair (A,v) ∈ Fk×n2 × F
n
2 , is to distinguish whether (A,v) is a uniformly random pair over F
k×n
2 × F
n
2 or is obtained by
choosing A
$
← Fk×n2 , u
$
← Fk2 , e
$
← B(n, t) and outputting (A,u ·A⊕ e). When k = k(λ), n = n(λ), t = t(λ), we say that
the DLPN(k, n,B(n, t)) problem is hard, if the success probability of any PPT distinguisher is at most 1/2 + negl(λ).
B. Group Signatures
We follow the definition of group signatures provided in [14] for the case of static groups.
Definition 4: A group signature
GS = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Open)
is a tuple of the following four polynomial-time algorithms.
1) KeyGen: This randomized algorithm takes as input (1λ, 1N), where N ∈ N is the number of group users, and outputs
(gpk, gmsk, gsk), where gpk is the group public key, gmsk is the group manager’s secret key, and gsk = {gsk[j]}j∈[0,N−1]
with gsk[j] being the secret key for the group user of index j.
2) Sign: This randomized algorithm takes as input a secret signing key gsk[j] for some j ∈ [0, N − 1] and a message M
and returns a group signature Σ on M .
3) Verify: This deterministic algorithm takes as input the group public key gpk, a message M , a signature Σ on M . The
output is either 1 (Accept) or 0 (Reject).
4) Open: This deterministic algorithm takes as input the group manager’s secret key gmsk, a message M , a signature Σ on
M . It outputs either an index j ∈ [0, N − 1], which is associated with a particular user, or ⊥, indicating failure.
A correct group signature scheme requires that, for all λ,N ∈ N, all (gpk, gmsk, gsk) produced by KeyGen(1λ, 1N), all
j ∈ [0, N − 1], and all messages M ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have
Verify
(
gpk,M,Sign(gsk[j],M)
)
= 1 and Open
(
gmsk,M,Sign(gsk[j],M)
)
= j.
A secure group signature scheme must meet two security conditions.
1) Traceability: all signatures, even those produced by a coalition of group users and the group manager, can be traced back
to a member of the coalition.
72) Anonymity: signatures generated by two distinct group users are computationally indistinguishable to an adversary who
knows all of the user secret keys. In Bellare et al.’s model [14], the anonymity adversary is granted access to an opening
oracle (CCA-anonymity). A relaxed notion, where the adversary cannot query the opening oracle (CPA-anonymity), was
later proposed by Boneh et al. [4].
We now give the formal definitions of CPA-anonymity, CCA-anonymity and traceability.
Definition 5: A group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify,Open) is CPA-anonymous if, for all polynomial N(·) and any
PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ.
1) Run (gpk, gmsk, gsk)← KeyGen(1λ, 1N ) and send (gpk, gsk) to A.
2) A outputs two identities j0, j1 ∈ [0, N−1] with a message M
∗. Choose a random bit b and give Σ∗ ← Sign(gsk[jb],M
∗)
to A. Then, A outputs a bit b′.
If b′ = b, then A succeeds. The advantage of A is defined to be
∣∣∣∣Pr[A succeeds]− 12
∣∣∣∣.
A group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify,Open) is CCA-anonymous if for all polynomialN(·) and any PPT adversaries
A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ.
1) Run (gpk, gmsk, gsk)← KeyGen(1λ, 1N ) and send (gpk, gsk) to A.
2) A can make queries to the opening oracle. On input a messageM and a signature Σ, the oracle returns Open(gmsk,M,Σ)
to A.
3) A outputs two identities j0, j1 ∈ [0, N−1] with a message M∗. Choose a random bit b and give Σ∗ ← Sign(gsk[jb],M∗)
to A.
4) A can make further queries to the opening oracle, with the exception that it cannot query for the opening of (M∗,Σ∗).
5) Finally, A outputs a bit b′.
A succeeds if b′ = b. The advantage of A is defined to
∣∣∣∣Pr[A succeeds]− 12
∣∣∣∣.
A group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify,Open) is traceable if for all polynomial N(·) and any PPT adversaries A,
the success probability of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ.
1) Run (gpk, gmsk, gsk)← KeyGen(1λ, 1N ) and send (gpk, gmsk) to A.
2) A may query the following oracles adaptively and in any order.
a) An OCorrupt oracle that on input j ∈ [0, N − 1], outputs gsk[j].
b) An OSign oracle that on input j, a message M , returns Sign(gsk[j],M).
Let CU be the set of identities queried to OCorrupt.
3) Finally, A outputs a message M∗ and a signature Σ∗.
A succeeds if Verify(gpk,M∗,Σ∗) = 1 and Sign(gsk[j],M∗) was never queried for j /∈ CU , yet Open(gmsk,M∗,Σ∗) /∈ CU .
III. THE UNDERLYING ZERO-KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT SYSTEM
A statistical zero-knowledge argument system is an interactive protocol where the soundness property holds for computa-
tionally bounded cheating provers, while the zero-knowledge property holds against any cheating verifier. In this section we
present a statistical zero-knowledge argument system which will serve as a building block in our group signature scheme in
Section IV.
Before describing the protocol, we introduce several supporting notations and techniques. Let ℓ be a positive integer and
N = 2ℓ. For x = (x0, x1, . . . , xN−1) ∈ FN2 and for j ∈ [0, N − 1], we write x = δ
N
j if xj = 1 and xi = 0 for all
i 6= j. An encoding function Encode : [0, N − 1] → F2ℓ2 maps an integer j ∈ [0, N − 1], whose binary representation is
I2B(j) = (j0, . . . , jℓ−1), to the vector
Encode(j) = (1− j0, j0, . . . , 1− ji, ji, . . . , 1− jℓ−1, jℓ−1).
Given a vector b = (b0, . . . , bℓ−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, we define two pertmutations. The first permutation Tb : FN2 → F
N
2 transforms
x = (x0, . . . , xN−1) to (x
′
0, . . . , x
′
N−1), where for each i ∈ [0, N − 1], we have xi = x
′
i∗ with i
∗ = B2I
(
I2B(i) ⊕ b
)
. The
second permutation T ′
b
: F2ℓ2 → F
2ℓ
2 maps f =
(
f0, f1, . . . , f2i, f2i+1, . . . , f2(ℓ−1), f2(ℓ−1)+1
)
to(
fb0 , f1−b0 , . . . , f2i+bi , f2i+(1−bi), . . . , f2(ℓ−1)+bℓ−1 , f2(ℓ−1)+(1−bℓ−1)
)
.
Observe that, for any j ∈ [0, N − 1] and any b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, we have
x = δNj ⇐⇒ Tb(x) = δ
N
B2I(I2B(j)⊕b) and (4)
f = Encode(j) ⇐⇒ T ′b(f) = Encode(B2I(I2B(j)⊕ b)). (5)
Example 1: Let N = 24 and j = 6. Then I2B(j) = (0, 1, 1, 0) and Encode(j) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0). If b = (1, 0, 1, 0),
then B2I(I2B(j)⊕ b) = B2I(1, 1, 0, 0) = 12. We have Tb(δ166 ) = δ
16
12 and
T ′b(Encode(6)) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) = Encode(12).
8A. The Interactive Protocol
We now present our interactive zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK). Let n, k, t,m, r, ω, ℓ be positive integers,
and N = 2ℓ. The public input consists of matrices G1,G2 ∈ F
k×n
2 , H ∈ F
r×m
2 , the N syndromes y0, . . . ,yN−1 ∈ F
r
2, and
vectors c1, c2 ∈ Fn2 . The protocol allows the prover P to simultaneously convince the verifier V in zero-knowledge that P
possesses a vector s ∈ B(m,ω) corresponding to certain syndrome yj ∈ {y0, . . . ,yN−1} with hidden index j, and that c1 and
c2 are correct encryptions of I2B(j) via two instances of the randomized McEliece encryption. Specifically, the secret witness
of P is a tuple (j, s,u1,u2, e1, e2) ∈ [0, N − 1]× F
m
2 × (F
k−ℓ
2 )
2 × (Fn2 )
2 that satisfies
H · s⊤ = y⊤j ∧ s ∈ B(m,ω),(
u1 ‖ I2B(j)
)
·G1 ⊕ e1 = c1 ∧ e1 ∈ B(n, t),(
u2 ‖ I2B(j)
)
·G2 ⊕ e2 = c2 ∧ e2 ∈ B(n, t).
(6)
LetA =
[
y⊤0 | · · · |y
⊤
j | · · · |y
⊤
N−1
]
∈ Fr×N2 and x = δ
N
j . We haveA·x
⊤ = y⊤j and rewriteH·s
⊤ = y⊤j asH·s
⊤⊕A·x⊤ = 0.
Let Ĝ ∈ F
(k+ℓ)×n
2 be the matrix obtained from G ∈ F
k×n
2 by replacing its last ℓ rows gk−ℓ+1,gk−ℓ+2, . . . ,gk by the 2ℓ rows
0n,gk−ℓ+1,0
n,gk−ℓ+2, . . . ,0
n,gk. We then observe that
(
u‖ I2B(j)
)
·G =
(
u‖Encode(j)
)
· Ĝ.
Letting f = Encode(j), we can equivalently rewrite (6) as{
H · s⊤ ⊕A · x⊤ = 0 ∧ x = δNj ∧ s ∈ B(m,ω),(
u‖ f
)
· Ĝ⊕ e = c ∧ f = Encode(j) ∧ e ∈ B(n, t).
(7)
To obtain a ZKAoK for relation (7) in Stern’s framework [20], P proceeds as follows.
To prove that x = δNj and f = Encode(j) while keeping j secret, P samples a uniformly random vector b ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ, sends
b1 = I2B(j)⊕ b, and shows that
Tb(x) = δ
N
B2I(b1)
∧ T ′
b
(f) = Encode(B2I(b1)).
By the equivalences observed in (4) and (5), the verifier will be convinced about the facts to prove. Furthermore, since b
essentially acts as a one-time pad, the secret j remains perfectly hidden.
To prove in zero-knowledge that s ∈ B(m,ω), P samples a uniformly random permutation π ∈ Sm, and shows that
π(s) ∈ B(m,ω). Similarly, to prove in zero-knowledge that e ∈ B(n, t), a uniformly random permutation σ ∈ Sn is employed.
Finally, to prove the linear equations in zero-knowledge, P samples uniformly random “masking” vectors (rs, rx, ru, rf , re)
and shows that
H · (s⊕ rs)
⊤ ⊕ A · (x⊕ rx)
⊤ = H · r⊤
s
⊕ A · r⊤
x
and(
u⊕ ru ‖ f ⊕ rf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ (e⊕ re) ⊕ c =
(
ru ‖ rf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ re. (8)
Now let COM : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a collision-resistant hash function, to be modelled as a random oracle. The prover P
and the verifier V first perform the preparatory steps described above, and then interact as described in Figure 1.
B. Analysis of the Protocol
The following theorem summarizes the properties of our protocol.
Theorem 2: The interactive protocol described in Section III-A has perfect completeness. Its communication cost is bounded
above by β = (N + 3 logN) +m(logm + 1) + n(logn + 1) + k + 5λ bits. If COM is modelled as a random oracle, then
the protocol is statistical zero-knowledge. If COM is a collision-resistant hash function, then the protocol is an argument of
knowledge.
The given interactive protocol is perfectly complete, i.e., if P possesses a valid witness (j, s,u, e) and follows the protocol,
then V always outputs 1. Indeed, given (j, s,u, e) satisfying (6), P can always obtain (j, s,x,u, f , e) satisfying (7). Then, as
discussed above, the following three assertions hold.
∀ π ∈ Sm : π(s) ∈ B(m,ω),
∀ σ ∈ Sn : σ(e) ∈ B(n, t),
∀ b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ : Tb(x) = δ
N
B2I(I2B(j)⊕b) = wx and T
′
b(f) = Encode(B2I(I2B(j)⊕ b)) = wf .
Thus, P always passes V’s checks whenever Ch = 1. When Ch = 2, P also passes the verification since the linear equations
in (8) hold true. Finally, for Ch = 3, it suffices to note that V simply checks for honest computations of c1 and c2.
Let us now consider the communication cost. The commitment CMT has bit-size 3λ. If Ch = 1, then the response RSP
has bit-size 3ℓ+N+2(m+n+λ). If Ch = 2 or Ch = 3, then RSP has bit-size 2ℓ+N+m(logm+1)+n(logn+1)+k+2λ.
Therefore, the protocol’s total communication cost, in bits, is less than the specified bound β.
The following lemma says that our interactive protocol is statistically zero-knowledge if COM is modelled as a random
oracle. We will supply a proof of Lemma 3 later in Appendix A-A. It employs the standard simulation technique for Stern-type
protocols as was done, e.g., in [20], [63], and [64].
91) Commitment: P samples the uniformly random objects
b
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, π
$
← Sm, σ
$
← Sn, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3
$
← {0, 1}λ, rs
$
← Fm2 , rx
$
← FN2 , ru
$
← Fk−ℓ2 , rf
$
← F2ℓ2 , re
$
← Fn2 .
It then sends the commitment CMT := (c1, c2, c3) to V , where
c1 = COM
(
b, π, σ, H · r⊤
s
⊕ A · r⊤
x
,
(
ru ‖ rf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ re; ρ1
)
,
c2 = COM
(
π(rs), Tb(rx), T
′
b(rf ), σ(re); ρ2
)
,
c3 = COM
(
π(s ⊕ rs), Tb(x⊕ rx), T
′
b
(f ⊕ rf ), σ(e⊕ re); ρ3
)
.
2) Challenge: Upon receiving CMT, V sends a challenge Ch
$
← {1, 2, 3} to P .
3) Response: P responds based on Ch.
a) If Ch = 1: Reveal c2 and c3. Let
b1 = I2B(j)⊕ b, vs = π(rs), ws = π(s), vx = Tb(rx), vf = T
′
b(rf ), ve = σ(re), and we = σ(e).
Send RSP :=
(
b1, vs, ws, vx, vf , ve, we; ρ2, ρ3
)
to V .
b) If Ch = 2: Reveal c1 and c3. Let
b2 = b, π2 = π, σ2 = σ, zs = s⊕ rs, zx = x⊕ rx, zu = u⊕ ru, zf = f ⊕ rf , and ze = e⊕ re.
Send RSP :=
(
b2, π2, σ2, zs, zx, zu, zf , ze; ρ1, ρ3
)
to V .
c) If Ch = 3: Reveal c1 and c2. Let
b3 = b, π3 = π, σ3 = σ, ys = rs, yx = rx, yu = ru, yf = rf , and ye = re.
Send RSP :=
(
b3, π3, σ3, ys, yx, yu, yf , ye; ρ1, ρ2
)
to V .
4) Verification: Upon receiving RSP, V proceeds based on Ch.
a) If Ch = 1: Let wx = δ
N
B2I(b1)
∈ FN2 and wf = Encode(B2I(b1)) ∈ F
2ℓ
2 .
Check that ws ∈ B(m,ω), we ∈ B(n, t),
c2 = COM
(
vs, vx, vf , ve; ρ2
)
, and c3 = COM
(
vs ⊕ws, vx ⊕wx, vf ⊕wf , ve ⊕we; ρ3
)
.
b) If Ch = 2: Check that
c1 = COM
(
b2, π2, σ2, H · z
⊤
s ⊕ A · z
⊤
x ,
(
zu ‖zf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ ze ⊕ c; ρ1
)
and
c3 = COM
(
π2(zs), Tb2(zx), T
′
b2
(zf
)
, σ2(ze); ρ3
)
.
c) If Ch = 3: Check that
c1 = COM
(
b3, π3, σ3, H · y
⊤
s ⊕ A · y
⊤
x ,
(
yu ‖yf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ ye; ρ1
)
and
c2 = COM
(
π3(ys), Tb3(yx), T
′
b3
(yf ), σ3(ye); ρ2
)
.
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all of the conditions hold. Otherwise, V outputs 0.
Fig. 1: The underlying ZK protocol of the CPA-anonymous group signature.
Lemma 3: In the random oracle model, there exists an efficient simulator S interacting with a (possibly cheating) verifier V̂,
such that, given only the public input of the protocol, S outputs, with probability negligibly close to 2/3, a simulated transcript
that is statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
The next lemma, whose proof will be provided in Appendix A-B, establishes that our protocol satisfies the special soundness
property of Σ-protocols. This implies, as had been shown in [65], that the protocol is indeed an argument of knowledge.
Lemma 4: Let COM be a collision-resistant hash function. Given the public input of the protocol, a commitment CMT
and three valid responses RSP1,RSP2,RSP3 to all three possible values of the challenge Ch, one can efficiently construct
a knowledge extractor E that outputs a tuple (j′, s′,u′, e′) ∈ [0, N − 1] × Fm2 × F
k−ℓ
2 × F
n
2 that simultaneously satisfies the
requirements H · s′⊤ = y⊤j′ , s
′ ∈ B(m,ω),
(
u′ ‖ I2B(j′)
)
·G ⊕ e′ = c, and e′ ∈ B(n, t).
IV. A CPA-ANONYMOUS CODE-BASED GROUP SIGNATURE
This section discusses our basic scheme that achieves CPA-anonimity. We start with a description of the scheme and end
with the evaluation of its properties.
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A. Description, Efficiency, and Correctness of the Scheme
Our group signature scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
1) KeyGen(1λ, 1N ): On input a security parameter λ and an expected number of group users N = 2ℓ ∈ poly(λ), for some
positive integer ℓ, this algorithm first selects the following parameters and hash functions.
a) Parameters n = n(λ), k = k(λ), t = t(λ) for a binary [n, k, 2t+ 1] Goppa code.
b) Parameters m = m(λ), r = r(λ), ω = ω(λ) for the Syndrome Decoding problem, such that
r ≤ log
(
m
w
)
− 2λ−O(1). (9)
c) Two collision-resistant hash functions, to be modelled as random oracles:
i) COM : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ to generate zero-knowledge arguments.
ii) H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ, where κ = ω · logλ, for the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
The algorithm then performs the following steps.
a) Run ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) to obtain a key pair
(
pkME = G ∈ F
k×n
2 ; skME
)
for the randomized McEliece encryption
scheme with respect to a binary [n, k, 2t+ 1] Goppa code. The plaintext space is Fℓ2.
b) Choose a matrix H
$
←− Fr×m2 .
c) For each j ∈ [0, N−1], pick sj
$
←− B(m,ω) and let yj ∈ Fr2 be its syndrome, i.e., y
⊤
j = H · s
⊤
j .
d) Output (
gpk = (G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1), gmsk = skME, gsk = (s0, . . . , sN−1)
)
. (10)
2) Sign(gsk[j],M): To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ under gpk, the group user of index j, who possesses secret key
s = gsk[j], performs the following steps.
a) Encrypt the binary representation of j, i.e., I2B(j) ∈ Fℓ2, under the randomized McEliece encrypting key G. This is
done by sampling (u
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 , e
$
←− B(n, t)) and outputting the ciphertext c =
(
u‖ I2B(j)
)
·G⊕ e ∈ Fn2 .
b) Generate a NIZKAoK Π to simultaneously prove, in zero-knowledge, the possession of an s ∈ B(m,ω) corresponding
to a certain syndrome yj ∈ {y0, . . . ,yN−1} with hidden index j, and that c is a correct McEliece encryption of I2B(j).
This is done by employing the interactive argument system in Section III with public input (G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c),
and prover’s witness (j, s,u, e) that satisfies
H · s⊤ = y⊤j , s ∈ B(m,ω),
(
u‖ I2B(j)
)
·G⊕ e = c, e ∈ B(n, t). (11)
The protocol is repeated κ = ω · logλ times to achieve negligible soundness error, before being made non-interactive
by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We have
Π =
(
CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ); (Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ)); RSP(1), . . . ,RSP(κ)
)
, (12)
where
(
Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ)
)
= H
(
M ;CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ); gpk, c
)
∈ {1, 2, 3}κ.
c) Output the group signature Σ = (c,Π).
3) Verify(gpk,M,Σ): Parse Σ as (c,Π), parse Π as in (12), and then proceed as follows.
a) If
(
Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ)
)
6= H
(
M ;CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ); gpk, c
)
, then return 0.
b) For i = 1 to κ, run the verification step of the interactive protocol in Section III on public input (G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c)
to check the validity of RSP(i) with respect to CMT(i) and Ch(i). If any of the verification conditions fails to hold,
then return 0.
c) Return 1.
4) Open(gmsk,M,Σ): Parse Σ as (c,Π) and run ME.Dec(gmsk, c) to decrypt c. If decryption fails, then return ⊥. If
decryption outputs g ∈ Fℓ2, then return j = B2I(g) ∈ [0, N − 1].
Remark 1: Lemma 1 assures us that, for the parameters m, r, ω that satisfy the inequality condition in (9), the distribution
of syndrome yj , for all j ∈ [0, N−1], is statistically close to the uniform distribution over F
r
2.
The efficiency, correctness, and security aspects of the above group signature scheme can now be summarized into the
following theorem.
Theorem 5: The given group signature scheme is correct. The public key has size nk + (m+N)r bits. The bit-size of the
signatures is bounded above by
(
(N + 3 logN) +m(logm+ 1) + n(logn+ 1)+ k + 5λ
)
κ+ n. In the random oracle model
we can make two further assertions. First, if the Decisional McEliece problem DMcE(n, k, t) and the Decisional Learning
Parity with fixed-weight Noise problem DLPN(k− ℓ, n,B(n, t)) are hard, then the scheme is CPA-anonymous. Second, if the
Syndrome Decoding problem SD(m, r, ω) is hard, then the scheme is traceable.
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In terms of efficiency, it is clear from (10) that gpk has bit-size nk+ (m+N)r. The length of the NIZKAoK Π is κ times
the communication cost of the underlying interactive protocol. Thus, by Theorem 2, Σ = (c,Π) has bit-size bounded above
by
(
(N + 3 logN) +m(logm+ 1) + n(logn+ 1) + k + 5λ
)
κ+ n.
To see that the given group signature scheme is correct, first observe that the honest user with index j, for any j ∈ [0, N−1],
can always obtain a tuple (j, s,u, e) satisfying (11). Then, since the underlying interactive protocol is perfectly complete, Π
is a valid NIZKAoK and algorithm Verify(gpk,M,Σ) always outputs 1, for any message M ∈ {0, 1}∗. On the correctness of
Open, it suffices to note that, if the ciphertext c is of the form c =
(
u‖ I2B(j)
)
·G ⊕ e, where e ∈ B(n, t), then, by the
correctness of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme, ME.Dec(gmsk, c) outputs I2B(j).
B. Anonymity
Let A be any PPT adversary attacking the CPA-anonymity of the scheme with advantage ǫ. We will prove that ǫ = negl(λ)
based on the ZK property of the underlying argument system. To do so, we retain the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t)
and the DLPN(k− ℓ, n,B(n, t)) problems. Specifically, we consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments G
(b)
0 , G
(b)
1 ,
G
(b)
2 , G
(b)
3 , and G4.
Experiment G
(b)
0 . This is the real CPA-anonymity game. The challenger runs KeyGen(1
λ, 1N) to obtain(
gpk = (G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1), gmsk = skME, gsk = (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1])
)
,
and then gives gpk and {gsk[j]}j∈[0,N−1] to A. In the challenge phase, A outputs a message M
∗ together with two indices
j0, j1 ∈ [0, N − 1]. The challenger sends back a challenge signature Σ∗ = (c∗,Π∗) ← Sign(gpk, gsk[jb]), where c∗ =(
u‖ I2B(jb)
)
·G⊕ e, with u
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 and e
$
←− B(n, t). The adversary then outputs b with probability 1/2 + ǫ.
Experiment G
(b)
1 . This experiment introduces a modification in the challenge phase. Instead of faithfully generating the
NIZKAoK Π∗, the challenger simulates it as follows.
1) Compute c∗ ∈ Fn2 as in Experiment G
(b)
0 .
2) Run the simulator of the underlying interactive protocol κ = ω(logλ) times on input (G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c
∗). Program
the random oracle H accordingly.
3) Output the simulated NIZKAoK Π∗.
Since the underlying argument system is statistically zero-knowledge, Π∗ is statistically close to the real NIZKAoK. As a
result, the simulated signature Σ∗ =
(
c∗,Π∗
)
is statistically close to the one in experiment G
(b)
0 . It then follows that G
(b)
0 and
G
(b)
1 are indistinguishable from A’s view.
Experiment G
(b)
2 . This experiment makes the following change with respect to G
(b)
1 . The encrypting key G obtained from
ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) is replaced by a uniformly random matrix G
$
←− Fk×n2 . Lemma 6 will demonstrate that Experiments G
(b)
1
and G
(b)
2 are computationally indistinguishable based on the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem.
Lemma 6: If A can distinguish Experiments G
(b)
1 and G
(b)
2 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then there exists
an efficient distinguisher D1 that solves the DMcE(n, k, t) problem with the same probability.
Proof: An instance of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem is G∗ ∈ Fk×n2 , which can either be uniformly random or be generated
by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t). The distinguisher D1 receives a challenge instance G∗ and uses A to distinguish between the two. It
interacts with A by performing the following steps.
1) Setup. Generate (H,y0, . . . ,yN−1) and (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1]) as in the real scheme. Send A the pair(
gpk∗ = (G∗,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1), gsk = (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1])
)
.
2) Challenge. Upon receiving the challenge (M∗, j0, j1), D1 proceeds as follows.
a) Pick b
$
←− {0, 1}, and compute c∗ =
(
u‖ I2B(jb)
)
·G∗ ⊕ e, where u
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 and e
$
←− B(n, t).
b) Simulate the NIZKAoK Π∗ on input (G∗,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c
∗), and output Σ∗ =
(
c∗,Π∗
)
.
We observe that if G∗ is generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) then the view of A in the interaction with D1 is statistically
close to its view in Experiment G
(b)
1 with the challenger. On the other hand, if G
∗ is uniformly random, then A’s view is
statistically close to its view in Experiment G
(b)
2 . Therefore, if A can guess whether it is interacting with the challenger in
G
(b)
1 or G
(b)
2 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then D1 can use A’s guess to solve the challenge instance G
∗
of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, with the same probability.
Experiment G
(b)
3 . In Experiment G
(b)
2 we have
c∗ =
(
u‖ I2B(jb)
)
·G⊕ e = (u ·G1 ⊕ e)⊕ I2B(jb) ·G2,
where u
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 , e
$
←− B(n, t), G1 ∈ F
(k−ℓ)×n
2 , and G2 ∈ F
ℓ×n
2 such that
[
G1
G2
]
= G. Now, Experiment G
(b)
3 modifies
the generation of c∗ by replacing the original one with c∗ = v ⊕ I2B(jb) ·G2, where v
$
←− Fn2 . Experiments G
(b)
2 and G
(b)
3
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are computationally indistinguishable based on the assumed hardness of the DLPN(k − ℓ, n,B(n, t)) problem, as shown in
Lemma 7.
Lemma 7: If A can distinguish Experiments G
(b)
2 and G
(b)
3 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then there exists
an efficient distinguisher D2 solving the DLPN(k − ℓ, n,B(n, t)) problem with the same probability.
Proof: An instance of the DLPN(k − ℓ, n,B(n, t)) problem is a pair (B,v) ∈ F
(k−ℓ)×n
2 × F
n
2 , where B is uniformly
random, and v is either uniformly random or of the form v = u ·B⊕e, for u
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 and e
$
←− B(n, t). The distinguisher D2
receives a challenge instance (B,v) and uses A to distinguish between the two. It interacts with A in the following manners.
1) Setup. Pick G2
$
←− Fℓ×n2 and let G
∗ =
[
B
G2
]
. Generate (H,y0, . . . ,yN−1) and (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1]) as in the real
scheme, and send A the pair
(
gpk∗ = (G∗,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1), gsk = (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1])
)
.
2) Challenge. Upon receiving the challenge (M∗, j0, j1), D2 first picks b
$
←− {0, 1} and lets c∗ = v ⊕ I2B(jb) ·G2, where
v comes from the challenge DLPN instance. It then simulates the NIZKAoK Π∗, on input (G∗,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c
∗),
and outputs Σ∗ =
(
c∗,Π∗
)
.
If D2’s input pair (B,v) is of the form (B,v = u · B ⊕ e), where u
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 and e
$
← B(n, t), then the view of A in
the interaction with D2 is statistically close to its view in Experiment G
(b)
2 with the challenger. On the other hand, if the pair
(B,v) is uniformly random, then A’s view is statistically close to its view in Experiment G
(b)
3 . Therefore, if A can guess
whether it is interacting with the challenger in G
(b)
2 or G
(b)
3 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then D2 can use
A’s guess to solve the challenge instance of the DLPN(k − ℓ,B(n, t)) problem with the same probability.
Experiment G4. This experiment is a modification of Experiment G
(b)
3 . The ciphertext c
∗ is now set as c∗ = r
$
←− Fn2 . Clearly,
the distributions of c∗ in Experiments G
(b)
3 and G4 are identical. As a result, G4 and G
(b)
3 are statistically indistinguishable.
We note that G4 no longer depends on the challenger’s bit b, and thus, A’s advantage in this experiment is 0.
The above discussion shows that Experiments G
(b)
0 , G
(b)
1 , G
(b)
2 , G
(b)
3 , G4 are indistinguishable and that AdvA(G4) = 0. It
then follows that the advantage of A in attacking the CPA-anonymity of the scheme, i.e., in experiment G
(b)
0 , is negligible.
The CPA-anonymity property is, thus, confirmed.
C. Traceability
Let A be a PPT traceability adversary against our group signature scheme with success probability ǫ. We construct a PPT
algorithm F that solves the SD(m, r, ω) problem with success probability polynomially related to ǫ.
Algorithm F receives a challenge SD(m, r, ω) instance, i.e., a uniformly random matrix-syndrome pair (H˜, y˜) ∈ Fr×m2 ×F
r
2.
The goal of F is to find a vector s ∈ B(m,ω) such that H˜ · s⊤ = y˜⊤. It then carry out the following tasks.
1) Pick a guess j∗
$
←− [0, N − 1] and set yj∗ = y˜.
2) Set H = H˜. For each j ∈ [0, N − 1] such that j 6= j∗, sample sj
$
← B(m,ω) and set yj ∈ Fr2 to be its syndrome, i.e.,
y⊤j = H · s
⊤
j .
3) Run ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) to obtain a key pair
(
pkME = G ∈ F
k×n
2 ; skME
)
.
4) Send gpk =
(
G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1
)
and gmsk = skME to A.
Since the parameters m, r, ω were chosen such that r ≤ log
(
m
w
)
− 2λ − O(1), Lemma 1 says that the distribution of the
syndrome yj , for all j 6= j∗, is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Fr2. In addition, the syndrome yj∗ = y˜ is
truly uniform over Fr2. It then follows that the distribution of (y0, . . . ,yN−1) is statistically close to that of the real scheme
as noted in Remark 1. As a result, the distribution of (gpk, gmsk) is statistically close to the distribution expected by A.
The forger F then initializes a set CU = ∅ and handles the queries from A according to the following procedure.
1) Queries to the random oracle H are handled by consistently returning uniformly random values in {1, 2, 3}κ. Suppose
that A makes QH queries, then for each η ≤ QH, we let rη denote the answer to the η-th query.
2) OCorrupt(j), for any j ∈ [0, N − 1], depends on how j and j∗ are related. If j 6= j∗, then F sets CU := CU ∪ {j} and
gives sj to A. If j = j∗, then F aborts.
3) OSign(j,M), for any j ∈ [0, N−1] and any message M , also depends on j and j∗. If j 6= j∗, then F honestly computes a
signature, since it has the secret key sj . If j = j
∗, then F returns a simulated signature Σ∗ computed as in Section IV-B.
Please consult, specifically, Experiment G
(b)
1 in the proof of anonymity.
At some point, A outputs a forged group signature Σ∗ on some message M∗, where
Σ∗ =
(
c∗,
(
CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ); Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ); RSP(1), . . . ,RSP(κ)
))
.
By the requirements of the traceability experiment, one has Verify(gpk,M∗,Σ∗) = 1 and, for all j ∈ CU , signatures of user
j on M∗ were never queried. Now F uses skME to open Σ∗, and aborts if the opening algorithm does not output j∗. It can
be checked that F aborts with probability at most (N − 1)/N + (2/3)κ. This is because the choice of j∗ ∈ [0, N − 1] is
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completely hidden from A’s view and A can only violate the soundness of the argument system with probability at most
(2/3)κ. Thus, with probability at least 1/N − (2/3)κ,
Verify(gpk,M∗,Σ∗) = 1 ∧ Open(skME,M
∗,Σ∗) = j∗. (13)
Suppose that (13) holds. Algorithm F then exploits the forgery as follows. Denote by ∆ the tuple(
M∗;CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ);G,H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c
∗
)
.
Observe that if A has never queried the random oracle H on input ∆, then Pr
[(
Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ)
)
= H(∆)
]
≤ 3−κ. Thus,
with probability at least ǫ− 3−κ, there exists certain η∗ ≤ QH such that ∆ was the input of the η∗-th query. Next, F picks η∗
as the target forking point and replays A many times with the same random tape and input as in the original run. In each rerun,
for the first η∗ − 1 queries, A is given the same answers r1, . . . , rη∗−1 as in the initial run. From the η∗-th query onwards,
however, F replies with fresh random values r
′
η∗ , . . . , r
′
qH
$
←− {1, 2, 3}κ. The Improved Forking Lemma of Pointcheval and
Vaudenay [66, Lemma 7] implies that, with probability larger than 1/2 and within less than 32 ·QH/(ǫ− 3−κ) executions of
A, algorithm F can obtain a 3-fork involving the tuple ∆. Now, let the answers of F with respect to the 3-fork branches be
r1,η∗ = (Ch
(1)
1 , . . . ,Ch
(κ)
1 ); r2,η∗ = (Ch
(1)
2 , . . . ,Ch
(κ)
2 ); r3,κ∗ = (Ch
(1)
3 , . . . ,Ch
(κ)
3 ).
Then, by a simple calculation, one has
Pr
[
∃i ∈ {1, . . . , κ} : {Ch
(i)
1 ,Ch
(i)
2 ,Ch
(i)
3 } = {1, 2, 3}
]
= 1− (7/9)κ.
Conditioned on the existence of such index i, one parses the three forgeries corresponding to the fork branches to obtain(
RSP
(i)
1 ,RSP
(i)
2 ,RSP
(i)
3
)
. They turn out to be three valid responses with respect to 3 different challenges for the same
commitment CMT(i). Then, by using the knowledge extractor of the underlying interactive argument system (see Lemma 4),
one can efficiently extract a tuple (j′, s′,u′, e′) ∈ [0, N − 1]× Fm2 × F
k−ℓ
2 × F
n
2 such that
H · s′⊤ = y⊤j′ , s
′ ∈ B(m,ω),
(
u′ ‖ I2B(j′)
)
·G ⊕ e′ = c∗, e′ ∈ B(n, t).
Since the given group signature scheme is correct, the equation
(
u′ ‖ I2B(j′)
)
·G⊕e′ = c∗ implies that Open(skME,M∗,Σ∗) =
j′. On the other hand, we have Open(skME,M
∗,Σ∗) = j∗, which leads to j′ = j∗. Therefore, it holds that H˜ ·s′⊤ = H ·s′⊤ =
y⊤j∗ = y˜
⊤ and s′ ∈ B(m,ω). In other words, s′ is a valid solution to the challenge SD(m, r, ω) instance (H˜, y˜).
Finally, the above analysis shows that, if A has success probability ǫ and running time T in attacking the traceability of our
group signature scheme, then F has success probability at least 1/2
(
1/N − (2/3)κ
)(
1 − (7/9)κ
)
and running time at most
32 · T ·QH/(ǫ− 3−κ) + poly(λ,N). This concludes the proof of the traceability property.
V. ACHIEVING CCA-ANONYMITY
In this section, we propose and analyse a code-based group signature that achieves the strong notion of CCA-anonymity. The
scheme is an extension of the CPA-anonymous scheme described in Section IV-A. To achieve CCA-security for the underlying
encryption layer via the Naor-Yung transformation [51], the binary representation of the signer’s index j is now verifiably
encrypted twice under two different randomized McEliece public keys pkME
(1)
and pkME
(2)
. This enables CCA-anonymity
for the resulting group signature scheme. In describing the scheme, the focus is on presenting the modifications that we must
make with respect to the earlier scheme from Section IV-A.
A. Description of the Scheme
We start with the four algorithms that constitute the scheme.
1) KeyGen(1λ, 1N ): The algorithm proceeds as the key generation algorithm of Section IV-A, with the following alteration.
ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) is run twice, producing two key pairs (pkME
(1) = G(1), skME
(1)) and (pkME
(2) = G(2), skME
(2)) for
the randomized McEliece encryption. Then G(1) and G(2) are included in the group public key gpk, the opening secret
key gmsk is defined to be skME
(1), while skME
(2) is discarded.
2) Sign(gsk[j],M): The binary representation I2B(j) ∈ Fℓ2 of the user’s index j is now encrypted twice, under the keys
G(1) and G(2). The resulting ciphertexts c(1) and c(2) have the form
c(1) =
(
u(1) ‖ I2B(j)
)
·G(1) ⊕ e(1) ∈ Fn2 and c
(2) =
(
u(2) ‖ I2B(j)
)
·G(2) ⊕ e(2) ∈ Fn2 ,
where u(1),u(2)
$
←− Fk−ℓ2 and e
(1), e(2)
$
←− B(n, t).
The zero-knowledge protocol of the scheme from Section IV-A is then developed to enable the prover, possessing witness
(j, s,u(1),u(2), e(1), e(2)), to convince the verifier, with public input (G(1),G(2),H,y0, . . . ,yN−1, c
(1), c(2)), that
H · s⊤ = y⊤j , s ∈ B(m,ω), e
(1) ∈ B(n, t), e(2) ∈ B(n, t),(
u(1) ‖ I2B(j)
)
·G(1) ⊕ e(1) = c(1),
(
u(2) ‖ I2B(j)
)
·G(2) ⊕ e(2) = c(2). (14)
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The protocol employs the same technical ideas of the one described in Section III. The facts that ciphertexts c(1) and c(2)
encrypt the same plaintext I2B(j) is proved in zero-knowledge by executing two instances of the techniques for handling
one ciphertext c in the protocol of Section III. The full description of the protocol can be found in Appendix B.
Let Π be the NIZKAoK obtained by repeating the protocol κ = ω · logλ times and making it non-interactive via the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The group signature is set to be Σ = (c(1), c(2),Π), where
Π =
(
CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ); (Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ)); RSP(1), . . . ,RSP(κ)
)
(15)
and
(
Ch(1), . . . ,Ch(κ)
)
=H
(
M ;CMT(1), . . . ,CMT(κ); gpk, c(1), c(2)
)
∈ {1, 2, 3}κ.
3) Verify(gpk,M,Σ): This algorithm proceeds as the verification algorithm of the scheme from Section IV-A, with
(
c(1), c(2)
)
taking the place of c.
4) Open(gmsk,M,Σ): Parse Σ as
(
c(1), c(2),Π
)
and run ME.Dec
(
gmsk, c(1)
)
to decrypt c(1). If decryption fails, then
return ⊥. If decryption outputs g ∈ Fℓ2, then return j = B2I(g) ∈ [0, N − 1].
The efficiency, correctness, and security aspects of the above group signature scheme are summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 8: The given group signature scheme is correct. The public key has size 2nk+(m+N)r bits while the signatures
have bit-size bounded above by
(
(N +3 logN)+m(logm+1)+2n(logn+1)+2k+5λ
)
κ+n. In the random oracle model
we can make two further assertions. First, if the Decisional McEliece problem DMcE(n, k, t) and the Decisional Learning
Parity with fixed-weight Noise problem DLPN(k−ℓ, n,B(n, t)) are hard, and if the underlying NIZKAoK system is simulation-
sound, then the scheme is CCA-anonymous. Second, if the Syndrome Decoding problem SD(m, r, ω) is hard, then the scheme
is traceable.
Compared with the basic scheme in Section IV, the present scheme introduces one more McEliece encrypting matrix of size
nk bits in the group public key, one more n-bit ciphertext and its supporting ZK sub-argument of well-formedness contained
in Π in the group signature. Overall, the upgrade from CPA-anonymity to CCA-anonymity incurs only a small and reasonable
overhead in terms of efficiency. Since the correctness and traceability analyses of the scheme are almost identical to those
of the basis scheme in Section IV, the details are omitted here. In the next subsection, we will prove the CCA-anonymity
property, which is the distinguished feature that we aim to accomplish.
B. CCA-Anonymity
Let A be any PPT adversary attacking the CCA-anonymity of the scheme with advantage ǫ. We will prove that ǫ = negl(λ)
based on the ZK property and simulation-soundness of the underlying argument system. We keep the assumed hardness of
the DMcE(n, k, t) and the DLPN(k − ℓ, n,B(n, t)) problems. Specifically, we consider the following sequence of hybrid
experiments G
(b)
0 , G
(b)
1 , . . . , G
(b)
10 , G11, where b is the bit chosen by the challenger when generating the challenge signature.
Experiment G
(b)
0 . This is the real CCA-anonymity experiment. The challenger runs KeyGen(1
λ, 1N ) to obtain(
gpk = (G(1),G(2),H,y0, . . . ,yN−1), gmsk = skME
(1), gsk = (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1])
)
,
and then gives gpk and {gsk[j]}j∈[0,N−1] to A. Queries to the opening oracle are answered using the opening secret key
skME
(1). In the challenge phase, A outputs a message M∗ together with two indices j0, j1 ∈ [0, N − 1]. The challenger sends
back a challenge signature Σ∗ =
(
c(1),∗, c(2),∗,Π∗
)
← Sign(gpk, gsk[jb]). The adversary outputs b with probability 1/2 + ǫ.
Experiment G
(b)
1 . The only difference between this experiment and G
(b)
0 is that, when running KeyGen(1
λ, 1N ), the challenger
retains the the second decryption key skME
(2)
instead of discarding it. The view of A in the two experiments are identical.
Experiment G
(b)
2 . This experiment is like Experiment G
(b)
1 with one modification in the signature opening oracle. Instead of
using skME
(1) to open signatures, the challenger uses skME
(2). It is easy to see that A’s view will be the same as in Experiment
G
(b)
1 until an event F2 when A queries the opening of a signature Σ = (c
(1), c(2),Π) for which c(1) and c(2) encrypt distinct
elements of Fℓ2. Since such an event F2 could break the soundness of the zero-knowledge protocol used to generate Π, it could
happen only with negligible probability. Therefore, the probability that A outputs b in this experiment is negligibly close to
1/2 + ǫ.
Experiment G
(b)
3 . This experiment is identical to Experiment G
(b)
2 , except on one modification. Instead of faithfully computing
the NIZKAoK Π∗ using witness (j, s,u(1),u(2), e(1), e(2)), the challenger simulates it by running the simulator of the underlying
zero-knowledge protocol and programming the random oracle H. Note that Π∗ is a simulated argument for a true statement,
since c(1),∗ and c(2),∗ are honestly computed. Thanks to the statistical zero-knowledge property of the underlying protocol,
Experiment G
(b)
3 is statistically close to Experiment G
(b)
2 .
Experiment G
(b)
4 . This experiment is similar to Experiment G
(b)
2 in the proof of CPA-anonymity in Section IV-B. The only
modification, with respect to the encrypting key G(1), is that instead of generating it using ME.KeyGen(n, k, t), we sample it
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uniformly at random over Fk×n2 . By the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, this experiment is computationally
indistinguishable from the previous experiment.
Experiment G
(b)
5 . This experiment is similar to Experiment G
(b)
3 in the proof of CPA-anonymity in Section IV-B. Instead of
computing c(1),∗ as
c(1),∗ =
(
u(1) ‖ I2B(jb)
)
·G(1) ⊕ e(1) = (u(1) ·G
(1)
1 ⊕ e
(1))⊕ I2B(jb) ·G
(1)
2 ,
we let c(1),∗ = v(1)⊕I2B(jb)·G
(1)
2 , where v
(1) $←− Fn2 . The simulated NIZKAoK Π
∗ now corresponds to a false statement, since
c(1),∗ is not a well-formed ciphertext. Nevertheless, in the challenge phase, assuming the hardness of the DLPN(k−ℓ, n,B(n, t))
problem, the adversary A can only observe the modification of c(1),∗ with probability at most negligible in λ. The view of A
is thus computationally close to that in Experiment G
(b)
4 above until an event F5 which could happen after the challenge phase
when A queries the opening of a signature Σ =
(
c(1), c(2),Π
)
for which c(1) and c(2) encrypt distinct elements of Fℓ2. Since
such an event F5 could break the simulation-soundness of the underlying NIZKAoK, it could happen only with negligible
probability. Therefore, the success probability of A in this experiment is negligibly close to that in Experiment G
(b)
4 .
Experiment G
(b)
6 . This experiment modifies Experiment G
(b)
5 slightly. The ciphertext c
(1),∗ is now set as c(1),∗ = r(1)
$
←− Fn2 .
Clearly, the distributions of c(1),∗ in G
(b)
5 and G
(b)
6 are identical. Hence, the two experiments are statistically indistinguishable.
Experiment G
(b)
7 . This experiment switches the encrypting key G
(1) back to an honest key generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t),
and store the corresponding decryption key skME
(1). By the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, this experiment
is computationally indistinguishable from G
(b)
6 .
Experiment G
(b)
8 . In this experiment, we use skME
(1), instead of skME
(2), to answer signature opening queries. The view of A
is identical to that in Experiment G
(b)
7 above until an event F8 when A queries the opening of a signature Σ =
(
c(1), c(2),Π
)
for which c(1) and c(2) encrypt distinct elements of Fℓ2. Since such an event F8 could break the simulation-soundness of the
underlying NIZKAoK, it could happen only with negligible probability.
Experiment G
(b)
9 . This experiment is similar to ExperimentG
(b)
4 above. We merely replace the randomized McEliece encrypting
key G(2) by a uniformly random matrix in Fk×n2 . By the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, this experiment is
computationally indistinguishable from Experiment G
(b)
8 .
Experiment G
(b)
10 . This experiment is akin to Experiment G
(b)
5 . The second ciphertext c
(2),∗ is now computed as c(2),∗ =
v(2) ⊕ I2B(jb) ·G
(2)
2 , where v
(2) $←− Fn2 . Assuming the hardness of the DLPN(k − ℓ, n,B(n, t)) problem, this experiment is
computationally indistinguishable from G
(b)
9 .
Experiment G11. This experiment resembles Experiment G
(b)
6 above. The second ciphertext c
(2),∗ is now set as c(2),∗ =
r(2)
$
←− Fn2 . Clearly, the distributions of c
(2),∗ in G
(b)
10 and G11 are identical. As a result, the two experiments are statistically
indistinguishable. Moreover, since G11 no longer depends on the challenger’s bit b, the advantage of A in this experiment is
0.
The above discussion shows that Experiments G
(b)
0 , . . . , G
(b)
10 , G11 are indistinguishable and that A has no advantage in
game G11. It then follows that the advantage of A in attacking the CCA-anonymity of the scheme, i.e., in Experiment G
(b)
0 ,
is negligible. This concludes the justification for the CCA-anonymity property.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
This section presents basic implementation results of our proposed group signature schemes to demonstrate their feasibility.
A. Test Environment
The testing platform was a modern PC with a 3.4 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 32 GB of RAM. We employed the NTL [67]
and gf2x [68] libraries for efficient polynomial operations over any field of characteristic 2. The Paterson algorithm [69] was
used to decode binary Goppa codes in our implementation of the McEliece encryption. We employed SHA-3 with various
output sizes to realize several hash functions.
To achieve 80-bit security, we chose the following parameters. The McEliece parameters were set to (n, k, t) = (211, 1696, 32),
as in [70]. The parameters for Syndrome Decoding were set to (m, r, ω) = (2756, 550, 121) so that the distribution of
y0, . . . ,yN−1 is 2
−80-close to the uniform distribution over Fr2, by Lemma 1, and that the SD(m, r, ω) problem is intractable
with respect to the best known attacks. In particular, these parameters ensure the following work factor evaluations. First, the
Information Set Decoding algorithm proposed in [43] has work factor more than 280. For an evaluation formula, one can also
refer to [71, Slide 3]. Second, the birthday attacks presented in [42] have work factors more than 280. The number of protocol
repetitions κ was set to 140 to obtain soundness 1− 2−80.
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B. Experimental Results
Table II shows the implementation results of our CPA-anonymous group signature scheme, together with its public key and
signature sizes, with respect to various numbers of group users and different message sizes. To reduce the signature size, in
the underlying zero-knowledge protocol, we sent a random seed instead of permutations when Ch = 2. Similarly, we sent a
random seed instead of the whole response RSP when Ch = 3. Using this technique, the average signature sizes were reduced
to about 159 KB for 4, 096 = 212 users and 876 KB for 65, 536 = 216 users, respectively. Our public key and signature sizes
are linear in the number of group users N , but it does not come to the fore while N is less than 212 due to the respective
sizes of G and H.
TABLE II
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS AND SIZES OF OUR CPA-ANONYMOUS SCHEME.
N PK Size
Average
Message KeyGen Sign Verify Open
Signature Size
24
625 KB 111 KB
1 B
5.448
0.044 0.031
0.112
(=16) 1 GB 5.372 5.355
28
642 KB 114 KB
1 B
5.407
0.045 0.032
0.111
(=256) 1 GB 5.363 5.351
212
906 KB 159 KB
1 B
5.536
0.058 0.040
0.112
(=4,096) 1 GB 5.366 5.347
216
5.13 MB 876 KB
1 B
7.278
0.282 0.186
0.111
(=65,536) 1 GB 5.591 5.497
220
72.8 MB 12.4 MB
1 B
33.947
3.874 2.498
0.111
(=1,048,576) 1 GB 9.173 7.795
224
1.16 GB 196 MB
1 B
481.079
61.164 39.218
0.111
(=16,777,216) 1 GB 66.613 44.575
The unit for time is second. All implementation results are the averages from 100 tests.
Our implementation took 0.282 and 0.186 seconds for a 1 B message and 5.591 and 5.497 seconds for a 1 GB message,
respectively, to sign a message and to verify a generated signature for a group of 65, 536 users. In our experiments, it takes
about 5.30 seconds to hash a 1 GB message and it leads to the differences of signing and verifying times between a 1 B and
a 1 GB messages. One may naturally expect that running times should be increased once N becomes larger. But, in Table II,
the increases are negligible and on occasions the running time even decreases slightly as N grew up to 212. This could also
be due to the effect that the time required to perform other basic operations with parameters G and H had on the overall
running time.
Table III contains the implementation results of our CCA-anonymous group signature scheme, along with public key and
average signature sizes for various number of group users and different message sizes. The public key size of our CCA-
anonymous scheme is 434 KB larger than that of our CPA-anonymous version because it additionally requires the matrix
G(2). The average signature size is also about 46 KB larger since the response RSP additionally includes v
(2)
e , w
(2)
e when
Ch = 1 and z
(2)
u , z
(2)
e when Ch = 2. We remark that there is no additional element to be sent for Ch = 3 since we just
sent a random seed instead of the whole response, as in the implementation of our CPA-anonymous scheme. The results in
TABLE III
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS AND SIZES OF OUR CCA-ANONYMOUS SCHEME.
N PK Size
Average
Message KeyGen Sign Verify Open
Signature Size
24
1.06 MB 157 KB
1 B
10.660
0.065 0.046
0.111
(=16) 1 GB 5.366 5.351
28
1.08 MB 160 KB
1 B
10.605
0.066 0.046
0.112
(=256) 1 GB 5.382 5.369
212
1.34 MB 205 KB
1 B
10.731
0.080 0.056
0.112
(=4,096) 1 GB 5.381 5.362
216
5.56 MB 922 KB
1 B
12.438
0.309 0.202
0.111
(=65,536) 1 GB 5.629 5.519
220
73.2 MB 12.5 MB
1 B
39.099
3.998 2.504
0.111
(=1,048,576) 1 GB 9.322 7.829
224
1.16 GB 196 MB
1 B
490.219
62.878 39.358
0.111
(=16,777,216) 1 GB 68.177 44.648
The unit for time is second. All implementation results are the averages from 100 tests.
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Table III show that the CCA-anonymous version requires only a small overhead for key generation, signing, and verification.
For example, the key generation algorithm took about 5 seconds more, which corresponds to the key generation time for the
McEliece encryption. When the number of group users is less than 220, it also took about 0.020 seconds and 0.015 seconds
more to generate a signature and verify it, respectively. The overheads for signing are increased slightly once the number of
group users is 224, but they account for about 2.28% and 2.73% of total signing times for 1 B and 1 GB messages, respectively.
In conclusion, to our best knowledge, the implementation results presented here are the first ones for post-quantum group
signatures. We have thus demonstrated that our schemes, while not yet truly practical, are bringing post-quantum group
signatures closer to practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
We put forward two provably secure code-based group signature schemes in the random oracle model. The first scheme
satisfies the CPA-anonymity and traceability requirements for group signatures under the assumed hardness of three well-known
problems in code-based cryptography. These are the McEliece problem, the Learning Parity with Noise problem and a variant
of the Syndrome Decoding problem. We extend the basic scheme to achieve CCA-anonymity by exploiting the Naor-Yung
transformation. The feasibility of the proposed schemes is backed by implementation results. We believe that our schemes
constitute the only currently implementable candidate among known post-quantum group signatures.
The work we presented here inaugurates a foundational step in code-based group signatures. The natural continuation is to
work towards either one of the following goals: achieving signature size which is sub-linear in the number group users and
obtaining a secure scheme in the standard model.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPORTING PROOFS FOR THE UNDERLYING ZERO-KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
We provide supporting proofs that the interactive protocol given in Section III-A is a statistical zero-knowledge argument
of knowledge.
A. Proof of the Zero-Knowledge Property
Proof of Lemma 3: Simulator S, given the public input (H,A, Ĝ, c), begins by selecting a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This
is a prediction of the challenge value thatV̂ will not choose.
1) Case Ch = 1: S proceeds as follows.
a) Compute s′ ∈ Fm2 and x
′ ∈ FN2 such that H · s
′⊤ ⊕A · x′⊤ = 0. Compute u′ ∈ Fk−ℓ2 , f
′ ∈ F2ℓ2 , e
′ ∈ Fn2 such that(
u′ ‖ f ′
)
· Ĝ⊕ e′ = c. These steps can be done efficiently by using linear algebraic tools.
b) Sample uniformly random objects, and send a commitment computed in the same manner as of the real prover. More
explicitly, S samples
b
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, π
$
← Sm, σ
$
← Sn, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3
$
← {0, 1}λ,
rs
$
← Fm2 , rx
$
← FN2 , ru
$
← Fk−ℓ2 , rf
$
← F2ℓ2 , re
$
← Fn2 ,
and sends the commitment CMT := (c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3), where
c
′
1 = COM
(
b, π, σ, H · r⊤
s
⊕ A · r⊤
x
,
(
ru ‖ rf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ re; ρ1
)
,
c
′
2 = COM
(
π(rs), Tb(rx), T
′
b
(rf ), σ(re); ρ2
)
,
c
′
3 = COM
(
π(s′ ⊕ rs), Tb(x
′ ⊕ rx), T
′
b
(f ′ ⊕ rf ), σ(e
′ ⊕ re); ρ3
)
. (16)
Upon receiving a challenge Ch from V̂ , the simulator responds accordingly.
a) If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
b) If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
b, π, σ, s′ ⊕ rs, x′ ⊕ rx, u′ ⊕ ru, f ′ ⊕ rf , e′ ⊕ re; ρ1, ρ3
)
.
c) If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
b, π, σ, rs, rx, ru, rf , re; ρ1, ρ2
)
.
2) Case Ch = 2: S samples
j′
$
← [0, N − 1], s′
$
← B(m,ω), e′
$
← B(n, t), b
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, π
$
← Sm, σ
$
← Sn,
ρ1, ρ2, ρ3
$
← {0, 1}λ, rs
$
← Fm2 , rx
$
← FN2 , ru
$
← Fk−ℓ2 , rf
$
← F2ℓ2 , re
$
← Fn2 .
It also lets x′ = δNj′ and f
′ = Encode(j′). Then S sends the commitment CMT computed in the same manner as in (16).
Upon receiving a challenge Ch from V̂ , it responds as follows.
a) If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
I2B(j′)⊕ b, π(rs), π(s′), Tb(rx), T ′b(rf ), σ(re), σ(e
′); ρ2, ρ3
)
.
b) If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
c) If Ch = 3: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1,Ch = 3).
3) Case Ch = 3: The simulator performs the preparation as in the case Ch = 2 above. Additionally, it samples u′
$
← Fk−ℓ2 .
It then sends the commitment CMT := (c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3), where c
′
2, c
′
3 are computed as in (16) and
c
′
1=COM
(
b, π, σ, H · (s′ ⊕ rs)
⊤ ⊕A · (x′ ⊕ rx)
⊤,
(
u′ ⊕ ru‖f
′ ⊕ rf
)
· Ĝ⊕
(
e′ ⊕ re
)
⊕ c; ρ1
)
.
Upon receiving a challenge Ch from V̂ , it responds as follows.
a) If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2,Ch = 1).
b) If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1,Ch = 2).
c) If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
In every case that we have considered above, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the challenge
Ch from V̂ are statistically close to those in the real interaction, since the outputs of the random oracle COM are assumed
to be uniformly random. Hence, the probability that S outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover, one can check that
whenever the simulator does not abort, it provides a successful transcript, whose distribution is statistically close to that of the
prover in the real interaction. We have thus constructed a simulator that can successfully impersonate the honest prover, with
probability 2/3.
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B. Proof of the Argument of Knowledge Property
Proof of Lemma 4: Assume that we have a commitment CMT = (c1, c2, c3) and the three responses
RSP1 =
(
b1, vs, ws, vx, vf , ve, we; ρ2, ρ3
)
,
RSP2 =
(
b2, π2, σ2, zs, zx, zu, zf , ze; ρ1, ρ3
)
,
RSP3 =
(
b3, π3, σ3, ys, yx, yu, yf , ye; ρ1, ρ2
)
that satisfy all of the verification conditions when Ch = 1, Ch = 2, and Ch = 3, respectively. More explicitly, we have the
relations
ws ∈ B(m,ω), wx = δ
N
B2I(b1)
, wf = Encode(B2I(b1)), we ∈ B(n, t),
c1 = COM
(
b2, π2, σ2, H · z
⊤
s
⊕ A · z⊤
x
,
(
zu ‖zf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ ze ⊕ c; ρ1
)
= COM
(
b3, π3, σ3, H · y
⊤
s
⊕ A · y⊤
x
,
(
yu ‖yf
)
· Ĝ ⊕ ye; ρ1
)
,
c2 = COM
(
vs, vx, vf , ve; ρ2
)
=COM
(
π3(ys), Tb3(yx), T
′
b3
(yf ), σ3(ye); ρ2
)
,
c3 = COM
(
vs ⊕ws, vx ⊕wx, vf ⊕wf , ve ⊕we; ρ3
)
= COM
(
π2(zs), Tb2(zx), T
′
b2
(zf
)
, σ2(ze); ρ3
)
.
Based on the collision-resistance property of COM, we can infer that
b2 =b3; π2 = π3, σ2 = σ3; δ
N
B2I(b1)
=wx = Tb2(zx)⊕Tb3(yx) =Tb2(zx⊕yx),
Encode(B2I(b1)) = wf = T
′
b2
(zf )⊕ T
′
b3
(yf ) = T
′
b2
(zf ⊕ yf ),
B(m,ω) ∋ ws = π2(zs)⊕ π3(ys) = π2(zs ⊕ ys),
B(n, t) ∋ we = σ2(ze)⊕ σ3(ye) = σ2(ze ⊕ ye),
H·(zs ⊕ ys)
⊤ ⊕A·(zx ⊕ yx)
⊤ = 0, and
(
zu ⊕ yu‖zf ⊕ yf
)
·Ĝ⊕ (ze ⊕ ye) = c.
Let j′ = B2I(b1 ⊕ b2) ∈ [0, N − 1]. Let x
′ = zx ⊕ yx ∈ F
N
2 . Then, by (4), we have x
′ = δNj′ . Thus, A · x
′⊤ = y⊤j′ .
Let f ′ = zf ⊕ yf ∈ Fℓ2. Then, by (5), we have f
′ = Encode(j′).
Let s′ = zs ⊕ ys ∈ Fm2 . Then we have s
′ = π−12 (ws) ∈ B(m,ω).
Let e′ = ze ⊕ ye ∈ Fn2 . Then we have e
′ = σ−12 (we) ∈ B(n, t). Let u
′ = zu ⊕ yu ∈ F
k−ℓ
2 .
Furthermore, we have H · s′⊤ ⊕A · x′⊤ = 0 and
(
u′‖Encode(j′)
)
· Ĝ ⊕ e′ = c. They imply, respectively, that H · s′⊤ =
A · x′⊤ = y⊤j′ and
(
u′‖I2B(j′)
)
·G⊕ e′ = c.
We have thus constructed an efficient extractor E that outputs (j′, s′,u′, e′) ∈ [0, N − 1]× Fm2 × F
k−ℓ
2 × F
n
2 satisfying
H · s′⊤ = y⊤j′ , s
′ ∈ B(m,ω),
(
u′ ‖ I2B(j′)
)
·G⊕ e′ = c, e′ ∈ B(n, t).
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
THE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOL UNDERLYING THE CCA-ANONYMOUS GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME
The required ZK protocol is a simple extension of the one underlying the CPA-anonymous group signature that we have
described in Section III. Here, we handle two ciphertexts c(1) and c(2) of I2B(j) by executing two instances of the techniques
used for handling one ciphertext c from Section III.
Applying the same transformations as in Section III, we can translate the statement to be proved to proving knowledge of
s,x, {u(i)}i∈[2], f , {e
(i)}i∈[2] such that
H · s⊤ ⊕A · x⊤ = 0, x = δNj , s ∈ B(m,ω),
{
(
u(i) ‖ f
)
· Ĝ(i) ⊕ e(i) = c(i)}i∈[2], f = Encode(j), {e
(i) ∈ B(n, t)}i∈[2].
A ZK argument for the obtained equivalent statement can then be obtained in Stern’s framework, using the same permuting
and masking techniques of Section III. The resulting interactive protocol is described in Fig. 2, where COM is a collision-
resistant hash function modelled as a random oracle. The protocol is a statistical ZKAoK. Its simulator and extractor are
constructed in the same manner as for the protocol underlying the CPA-anonymous group signature, in the respective two
sections of Appendix A. The details can therefore be safely omitted here.
21
1) Commitment: P samples the following uniformly random objects.
b
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, π
$
← Sm, σ
(1), σ(2)
$
← Sn, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3
$
← {0, 1}λ,
rs
$
← Fm2 , rx
$
← FN2 , r
(1)
u , r
(2)
u
$
← Fk−ℓ2 , rf
$
← F2ℓ2 , r
(1)
e , r
(2)
e
$
← Fn2 .
It then sends the commitment CMT := (c1, c2, c3) to V , where
c1 = COM
(
b, π, {σ(i)}i∈[2], H · r
⊤
s ⊕ A · r
⊤
x , {( r
(i)
u ‖ rf ) · Ĝ
(i) ⊕ r(i)e }i∈[2]; ρ1
)
,
c2 = COM
(
π(rs), Tb(rx), T
′
b
(rf ), {σ
(i)(r(i)
e
)}i∈[2]; ρ2
)
,
c3 = COM
(
π(s⊕ rs), Tb(x⊕ rx), T
′
b
(f ⊕ rf ), {σ
(i)(e(i) ⊕ r(i)
e
)}i∈[2]; ρ3
)
.
2) Challenge: Upon receiving CMT, V sends a challenge Ch
$
← {1, 2, 3} to P .
3) Response: P responds accordingly.
a) If Ch = 1: Reveal c2 and c3. Let b1 = I2B(j)⊕ b,
vs = π(rs), ws = π(s), vx = Tb(rx), vf = T
′
b(rf ), {v
(i)
e = σ
(i)(r(i)e )}i∈[2], {w
(i)
e = σ
(i)(e(i))}i∈[2].
Send RSP :=
(
b1, vs, ws, vx, vf , {v
(i)
e , w
(i)
e }i∈[2]; ρ2, ρ3
)
to V .
b) If Ch = 2: Reveal c1 and c3. Let
b2 = b, π2 = π, {σ
(i)
2 = σ
(i)}i∈[2], zs = s ⊕ rs, zx = x⊕ rx,
{z(i)u = u
(i) ⊕ r(i)u }i∈[2], zf = f ⊕ rf , {z
(i)
e = e
(i) ⊕ r(i)e }i∈[2].
Send RSP :=
(
b2, π2, {σ
(i)
2 }i∈[2], zs, zx, {z
(i)
u }i∈[2], zf , {z
(i)
e }i∈[2]; ρ1, ρ3
)
to V .
c) If Ch = 3: Reveal c1 and c2. Let b3 = b,
π3 = π, {σ
(i)
3 = σ
(i)}i∈[2], ys = rs, yx = rx, {y
(i)
u
= r(i)
u
}i∈[2], yf = rf , {y
(i)
e
= r(i)
e
}i∈[2].
Send RSP :=
(
b3, π3, {σ
(i)
3 }i∈[2], ys, yx, {y
(i)
u }i∈[2], yf , {y
(i)
e }i∈[2]; ρ1, ρ2
)
to V .
4) Verification: Upon receiving RSP, V proceeds as follows.
a) If Ch = 1: Let wx = δ
N
B2I(b1)
∈ FN2 and wf = Encode(B2I(b1)) ∈ F
2ℓ
2 .
Check that ws ∈ B(m,ω) and {w
(i)
e ∈ B(n, t)}i∈[2], and that
c2 = COM
(
vs, vx, vf , {v
(i)
e
}i∈[2]; ρ2
)
and
c3 = COM
(
vs ⊕ws, vx ⊕wx, vf ⊕wf , {v
(i)
e ⊕w
(i)
e }i∈[2]; ρ3
)
.
b) If Ch = 2: Check that
c1 = COM
(
b2, π2, {σ
(i)
2 }i∈[2],H · z
⊤
s ⊕A · z
⊤
x , {(z
(i)
u ‖zf ) · Ĝ
(i) ⊕ z(i)e ⊕ c
(i)}i∈[2]; ρ1
)
,
c3 = COM
(
π2(zs), Tb2(zx), T
′
b2
(zf ), {σ
(i)
2 (z
(i)
e )}i∈[2]; ρ3
)
.
c) If Ch = 3: Check that
c1 = COM
(
b3, π3, {σ
(i)
3 }i∈[2], H · y
⊤
s ⊕ A · y
⊤
x , {(y
(i)
u ‖yf ) · Ĝ
(i) ⊕ y(i)e }i∈[2]; ρ1
)
,
c2 = COM
(
π3(ys), Tb3(yx), T
′
b3
(yf ), {σ
(i)
3 (y
(i)
e
)}i∈[2]; ρ2
)
.
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold. Otherwise, V outputs 0.
Fig. 2: The underlying ZK protocol of the CCA-anonymous group signature.
